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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PIaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 19533

ROBERT EUGENE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AS TO POINTS I, II, AND III
This brief is directed to the argument initially raised in
the opening brief of appellant concerning jury instructions,
selection of jurors, and prosecutor misconduct.

The brief of

the Attorney General in response to this opening brief was
filed on April 15, 1985.

Subsequently through the stipulation

of the Attorney General and appellant's counsel, the case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings as to
appellant's claim that the prosecutor withheld a police report
from the defense attorneys which showed the custody of the
murder weapon and negated all of the needless testimony at
trial concerning the identity of the weapon.

Since this was a

point which was unknown during the writing of the original
brief, a supplemental appellant's brief has been filed on Point
IV alone.

It is expected that the Attorney General will write

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a responding brief to Point IV alone.

If time permits, a reply

brief as to Point IV will also be submitted by appellant.
Before reexamining the individual points of appeal, a general statement should be made on behalf of appellant.

The

State argues in its brief the principle that jury instructions
must be examined as a whole in determining whether a jury has
been properly instructed.

(Response brief, p. 17.)

Likewise,

a similar principle applies in reviewing the contentions of a
criminal appellant.

The cumulative effect of the combined

errors claimed by an appellant must be evaluated in determining
whether a fair trial occurred.
(Wash. App. 1970).

State v. Whalon, 464 P.2d 730

Even though one single error in and of

itself may be insufficient for reversal, a combination of four
or five such errors can rise to the level requiring a new
trial.

State v. Budinich, 562 P.2d 1006 (Wash. App. 1977).

In the instant case the respondent Attorney General does
not contest that certain errors were made in the jury instructions.

The key "knowing" element was omitted from the first

degree and attempted first degree instruction.

A wrongful

"reckless" term was included in the second degree charge and
attempted second degree charge as well as the omission of other
language relating to a crime during a robbery.

Thus, there is

no question that the instructions themselves were erroneous.
The only question is what effect such instructions had upon the
jury.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
- 2 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is also no doubt that two of the jurors were
acquainted with relatives of the victims.

One juror had even

gone to the viewing of the victim and had discussed the circumstances surrounding his death with the victim's sister. It
is undisputed that both of these jurors expressed their desire
not to serve on the jury because of their intimate association
with the family.
Third, the record is clear that the prosecutor made many
statements concerning defendant's mental health which were not
supported by the evidence and which could only be interpreted
as an attempt to prejudice the defendant.

Again, while these

statements standing alone may not be grounds for reversal, the
accumulative effect clearly tainted defendant's trial and
requires reversal.
Finally, an examination of the supplemental brief shows
that the prosecutor failed to produce a critical police report
to the defense attorneys at the time of trial.

The record

shows an enormous amount of time being spent by both the
defense and the prosecution in an attempt to connect the
acknowledged murder weapon to one of two weapons purchased by
the defendant, one of which was given as a gift to Beverly
Jones.

The prosecutor knew at the time of trial that the

murder weapon belonged to neither, and was in fact a third gun
which had been purchased by a third party and pawned by another
third party after the killing.

Neither of the third parties

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testified at trial.

It is evident from reading the record that

the defense attorneys believed the murder weapon was one of the
two guns originally purchased by the defendant and spent much
effort trying to convince the jury it was the gun given by the
defendant as a gift to Beverly Jones.
The Attorney General can speculate as to what the jury
believed from the jury instructions; can speculate as to the
impartiality of the prospective jurors who knew the victim's
family; can hypothesize as to the effect the prosecutor's argument of mental competency would have upon the jury; and can
surmise what the defense would have done with the missing
police report had they had it.

However, this speculation is

hardly a substitution for a fair and impartial trial, especially when the defendant is now faced with life imprisonment.
While defendant acknowledges that he is not entitled to a perfect trial, the combination of all of these errors certainly
raises this trial above the threshold of permissible errors.
This combination of deliberate misconduct or accidental omission requires that a new trial be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in respondent's brief is
essentially supported by the record.
pp. 2-9.)

(Respondent's brief,

However, it should be noted that while respondent is

entitled to view the evidence most favorably to the verdict,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for purposes of this appeal the evidence offered by defendant
must also be considered.

The statement of facts of the respon-

dent contains the version of facts stated by Beverly Jones and
her family and friends.

The statement completely ignores facts

testified to by Jones and by his family and friends.

In this

case the question arises as to whether there is overwhelming
evidence to convict the defendant or whether the facts are so
close that an error could have made a significant difference.
The omission of this second line of testimony is therefore
material.
The physical evidence in this case is completely inconclusive*

A review of the medical testimony, for example, is

inconclusive for proving or disproving either Beverly Jones'
version or Roberts Jones' version of the shooting.

Likewise,

the ballistic evidence and other physical evidence is consistent with either story.
Essentially, this entire case evolved on the credibility of
Beverly Jones and Robert Jones.

It is only these two individu-

als who are alive to testify as to what truly happened in the
basement of the Chapman apartment on March 11, 1983.
One factual correction should also be made.

Respondent in

its brief states that defendant admitted that the murder weapon
"was one of two .38 handguns that he had purchased in 1982."
(Respondent's brief, p. 9.)
here.

The word "admit" is improper

Defendant believed that the gun used in the killing was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the gun he had given to Beverly Jones.

Beverly Jones, on the

other hand, testified she believed that the gun was the one
which Jones kept for himself.

As the facts later evolved from

the missing police report, however, neither of these guns was
the weapon.

It was a third gun which actually killed Chapman,

as the prosecution well knew.
Both sides agree that the identity of the weapon that
killed Chapman is extremely relevant to this case.

However,

the defense never made an issue of this point because of their
mistaken belief that the murder weapon was one of the two guns
purchased by defendant.
In summary, the testimony supporting the defendant Robert
Jones and that supporting Beverly Jones was about as diverse as
one could imagine in any trial.

Two complete different stories

of the events before the killing and at the time of the shooting were given to the jury.

Relevant facts were omitted in the

trial concerned the identity of the weapon itself which the
jury certainly should have considered in its deliberations and
in deciding which version of the story to believe.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY.
The respondent concedes that the term "knowingly" was
omitted from both the first degree and attempted first degree
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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instructions.

(Respondent's brief, p. 12.)

Respondent essen-

tially concedes that there were errors in the second degree
murder and attempted second degree murder instructions.
(Respondent's brief, p. 16.)

Finally, respondent acknowledges

that the burden of proof instruction was not contained in a
single instruction but was contained in a number of instructions given by the lower court.

(Respondent's brief, p. 16-17.)

With these concessions in mind, respondent then attempts to
second guess the jury by such statements as "the jury could not
have misunderstood," (Respondent's brief, p. 12); "The jury
could not possibly have convicted defendant of first degree
murder and attempted first degree murder on the erroneous
assumption that intent or knowledge was required with respect
to Kim Chapman's death but not with respect to Beverly's risk
of death," (Respondent's brief, p. 15); and "the only rational
inference to be drawn from the jury's verdict of guilty is that
they applied the intent element to both the element of Kim's
death and Beverly's risk of death."

(Respondent's brief,

P. 15.)
Respondent's speculation is interesting but certainly does
not overcome the counter-speculation that the jury rejected the
defendant's defenses because of confusion or misunderstanding
resulting from the improper instructions.

Defendant's version

of the incident could have resulted in his complete acquittal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,-7may contain errors.

or conviction for manslaughter, second degree murder, first
degree murder, attempted second degree murder, or attempted
first degree murder.

It is impossible to hypothesize as to

what effect these erroneous instructions had upon the jury's
consideration of these various charges since, for example, they
may have found defendant guilty of second degree murder or
attempted second degree murder had the instruction been given
properly but, because the instruction was not proper, were
forced to fit the factual context into the first degree murder
definition.
Respondent cites the case of State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that where the evidence
overwhelmingly supports conviction under one variation of crime
submitted to a jury, the reversal of the conviction is not
necessary even if there were erroneous instructions on another
variation.

(Respondent's brief, p. 16.) A review of this

court's decision in that case shows that prejudicial error does
not occur when there is "abundant evidence—both eye witness
testimony and physical evidence—from which the jury could
conclude that defendant" was guilty of a crime.

Under no

stretch of the imagination can the evidence in this case be
said to be "overwhelming" to prove defendant's guilt and,
therefore, these erroneous instructions cannot be ignored as
harmless error.

Nor should that principle apply where the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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erroneous instructions are those relating to specific defenses,
as was the case here.
Finally, respondent claims that the burden of proof
instructions were adequate since they were covered throughout
the various instructions cited by respondent.

However, even

reviewing all of these instructions collectively, there is no
instruction which states that the burden of proof never shifts
to a defendant or that if the jury viewed the evidence in the
case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, guilt
or innocence, the jury must find the defendant innocent.

The

fact, for instance, that instruction No. 35 informed the jury
that defendant had no burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted in self-defense is hardly the same thing as
informing the jury that the defendant has no burden whatsoever
to prove anything in the case imposed against him.
Thus, the instructions to the jury were erroneous and when
combined with the other errors, were clearly prejudicial.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN FAILING TO DISMISS TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS
FOR CAUSE.
Respondent attempts to attack this claim of appellant on
two fronts.

First, it attempts to minimize the factual evi-

dence as to these two potential jurors.

Second, it cites cases

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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allegedly finding that similar circumstances do not create
prejudicial jurors.
As to their factual attack, an examination of the very
record which is attached to the State's brief shows that its
factual assertions are incorrect.

As to Miss Opheikens, the

State would have this Court believe that she was "merely
acquainted with the State's witness Earl Chapman."
dent's brief, p. 21.)

(Respon-

Further, other than "going to the view-

ing Miss Opheikens did not have any direct contact with the
Chapman family."

(Respondent's brief, p. 19.)

The record shows that these characterizations are distorted.

First, Miss Opheikens stated that she knew the father

of the victim Kim Chapman, as well as going to school with his
daughters—the sisters of the victim.

When asked if she could

try the case on the merits and set aside any outside information and acquaintances, she replied, "Probably."
451-452).

(Transcript,

Thus, not only did Miss Opheikens know Mr. Chapman,

but she also knew the victim's sisters.

Next, Miss Opheikens

stated that she discussed the case with members of the Chapman
family at the viewing which included both Mr. Chapman, who
testified at trial, and the older sister.

When she was asked

whether she was told about what happened or at least discussed
it, she said, "Well, she just said how hard it was, and how the
basement was in a mess, and they had to hire people to come in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and clean it up, things like that."

(Record, p. 541.)

In

addition to those specific statements, the term "things like
that" could include other even more prejudicial statements of
which we are unaware.
When asked whether the potential juror thought she would
have to explain to the sister or other members of the Chapman
family what she had done with her verdict, she said it would be
hard to say.

She was asked if it would be a problem if a deci-

sion was rendered in favor of defendant Robert Jones.
replied, "Yes, that would be hard, I think."

She

(Record, p. 542).

The additional testimony quoted in appellant's previous
brief concerns her statements on several occasions that she
would require Mr. Jones to prove her innocence to her.
(Record, p. 546.)
The facts concerning potential juror Barbara Shepherd are
not as severe but nevertheless justified dismissing her for
cause.

The State mentions only part of her testimony.

She

hoped if she were chosen as a juror she wouldn't feel obligated
to explain her verdict to her co-worker Cheryl Chapman, the
wife of the victim's brother (Respondent's brief, p. 20.)
Her actual interview before the Court, however, is much
more revealing.

First, she stated that she followed the case

in the newspaper because she worked with the deceased, KimChapman's, sister-in-law.

(Record, p. 524-525.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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She next

stated that there "were comments out where I worked," and
"people was following it through because we do work with
Cheryl."

(Record, p. 525.)

When asked whether she could put

aside anything she had read or discussed at work for the evi- .
dence that came in trial, she replied, "I hope so."

(Record,

p. 525.)
When asked whether she would be able to look at photographs
concerning the body, she did not just reply she was skirmish
about photographs, but stated, "Now that would be hard, because
I see Cheryl every day.
way."

It would be hard.

Let's put it that

(Record, p. 528.)

Finally, she was asked:
Q

Even though you have had this association out to
work, do you think that you can sort of put that
aside, or would you feel like you have to go back
and answer to this gal depending on that your
situation is, or explain to her why you did what
you did?

A

I would hope not, but I do see her every day.

Q

You would really like not to serve on this jury;
is that a fair statement?

A

That is a fair statement.

(Record, p. 536.)
With these factual statements now corrected, it remains
to examine the law referred to by the respondent.

First, it

should be observed that in none of the cases cited by the state
did all of these particular problems arise.

In other words,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

there is not one single case cited by respondent in which
(1) one witness works with a close relative of the decedent and
states that they would have a hard time serving on the jury
because of this association; and (2) that another juror knows
the victim's father and sisters very well; and (3) that that
juror has gone to a funeral viewing and has discussed the circumstances of the basement and unknown facts with potential and
actual witnesses; and (4) that potential juror has stated that
she believes the defendant must prove his innocence. Again,
the combination effect must be considered by this Court and
even though in certain instances one of these claims may not be
sufficient for reversal, the combination of these four juror
claims, together with the other errors, certainly requires
reversal.
The State cites State v. Lacy, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983),
to support the notion that merely an acquaintance with witnesses does not require disqualification.

In that case, how-

ever, the witnesses were third parties who had no emotional
connection to the crime, whereas in this case those that were
known were close relatives who obviously were emotionally
involved because of the death.

Also, the remaining factors

enumerated in the preceding paragraph were absent.
In Grizzle v. State, 559 P.2d 474 (Okl. Cr. 1977) (Respondent's brief, p. 21), she did not know the victim's family, did

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not discuss any of the evidentiary details with witnesses, and
repeatedly said she could maintain an unbiased position.

Here,

Mrs. Opheikens herself knew the family, discussed evidentiary
details with members of the family, and stated on several
occasions that she would be biased against the defendant.
The other cases relied upon by respondents are

factually

distinguishable in one way or another or, in the alternative,
are sustainable only because they involve one of the claimed
errors rather than a combination, as in this case.
It is inconceivable why the lower court failed to excuse
these two potential jurors in light of the vast pool of potential jurors available in this trial.

The defense was forced to

use two preemptory challenges to remove these two jurors.

Any

person accused of a murder would certainly feel more than
uncomfortable having a juror who works with the victim's
sister-in-law sitting on one side of the jury box while having
a second juror who attended the victim's funeral, discussed the
scene of the murder with witnesses not subject to cross-examination, and who declared the defendant's guilt, sitting on the
other side of the jury box.

It is for these reasons that this

Court must remand this matter for a new trial in which a fair
jury selection can occur.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
THE CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
REQUIRES REVERSAL AND REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL.
The highlights of the closing argument of the prosecutor
have been set forth in appellant's opening brief (pp. 42-46.)
Little additional comment needs to be made.

The argument of

the prosecutor went beyond refuting any claim that the defendant was in a high state of mental stress at the time of the
incident.

Essentially the prosecutor gave his medical opinion

as to defendant's prior conduct, i.e. that such conduct was no
more than a facade and that he actually was not suffering from
any mental stress or problems.

It is one thing to comment upon

the evidence but it is quite another thing to actually give a
medical opinion as to the mental condition of defendant without
evidence to support it.
This Court has recently reaffirmed the proposition that
when there is highly marginal evidence in a case the prosecutor's prejudicial argument must be viewed much more strictly.
State v. Andreason, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (May 6, 1986).
Respondent contends that the evidence is overwhelming as to
defendant's guilt and therefore any impropriety by the prosecutor is harmless error.

The evidence of first degree murder was

only overwhelming if you overwhelmingly believe the testimony
of Beverly Jones.

Respondent lists a number of factors on

pages 26 and 27 supposedly showing the overwhelming case

-15-
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against defendant.

However, appellant submits that none of

this evidence is conclusive as to what occurred in the basement
of the Chapman residence.

There is no question that defendant

was highly upset and that his conduct in the past was not that
of a rational person.

However, whether such conduct rose to

the level of first degree murder, whether it was manslaughter
or whether he was merely defending himself against Kim Chapman
cannot be answered by any of the evidence cited by the respondent .
Appellant submits that a review of the medical testimony,
as well as any other scientific testimony in this case, is
completely inconclusive as to what actually occurred during the
struggle between the two men.

The only three persons who know

the truth to this answer are the decedent, Robert Jones, and
Beverly Jones.
Inferences and hypotheticals are easy to make, but can be
equally made for both the defense and the prosecution.

The

prosecutor argued, for example, that since no gun was found at
the murder scene this indicates that defendant carried it out
of the Chapman basement and also brought it in to shoot Kim and
Beverly.

First, even if defendant had carried out the weapon

from the basement, it does not mean that he brought it in.
Second, the evidence is clear that Beverly Jones was capable of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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movement after the shooting and could easily have hidden the
gun herself before the police arrived.
The medical and scientific evidence is equally vague.

It

is interesting to note, for example, that no tests were even
run on Kim Chapman's hands for indication of powder residue,
since the prosecutor and police were so certain that their
theory of the crime was correct.

After defendant insisted

these tests be run it was found that Kim Chapman indeed had
evidence of powder residue on his hands, giving rise to an
inference that he was closely involved with defendant in a
struggle and not that defendant shot Chapman from a distance.
In this type of case where intent, if nothing else, is a
critical factor in determining the degree of guilt, it was
improper for the prosecutor to add his own views on defendant's
mental capacity and conduct in the past.

While this may have

been harmless error in certain cases, it certainly was not in
the instant case.
CONCLUSION
The three areas of error referred to in this brief and the
opening brief of appellant merit reversal and a new trial.

The

additional error of failing to deliver a critical police report
to defense attorneys adds additional frosting to the prejudicial cake.

There can be no doubt that the cumulative effect of
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all of these errors denied defendant a fair trial which he was
constitutionally entitled to receive.

A review of the record

in this case even superficially shows a tremendous diversity
between the contentions of the prosecutor and the defense.
Much of the evidence is completely contradictory and other
evidence is inconclusive.

The credibility of Robert Jones and

Beverly Jones is the single most important factor for any jury
to consider in deciding this case.

Prejudicial errors which

effect this credibility cannot be tolerated.

Likewise, the

closeness of this case requires a strict scrutiny of all legal
principles utilized in the trial.

Since intent was a critical

issue for both parties, it was imperative that proper jury
instructions be given and that an unbiased jury be selected
which would weigh this intent fairly.

For the preceding

reasons, therefore, it is respectfully requested that this
matter be remanded for new trial.
DATED this

S 1 ^ day of August, 1986.
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